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Short Summary 
al Allocation Plans (NAP) for phase 2 (2008-2012) of the EU Emis-
e (EU ETS), we explore to which extent individual Member States 
histori-
 concepts and methodologies devel-
provements crucially hinge on the outcome of the 
Based on 18 Nation
sion Trading Schem
(MS) intend to use the ETS effectively and efficiently to reduce CO2 emissions.  
Our analyses at the macro level of these NAPs show that on average the ET-budgets 
in phase 2 are only about 3 % lower than the budgets in phase 1 (2005-2007), 
cal emissions in 2005 and projected emissions in 2010. While on average, the old MS 
intend to reduce emissions by about 10 %, compared to projected emissions, the im-
plied excess allocation in the new MS is more than 20 %. When compared with a cost-
efficient split of the required emission reductions, the ET-budgets in the EU-15 MS are 
generally too large. Thus, the burden for non-trading sectors (households, tertiary and 
transport) will be too high. Noteworthy are also the high shares of governments' in-
tended and companies' possible use of Kyoto Mechanisms, which challenge the tradi-
tional position held by the EU on supplementarity. 
In general, our analyses at the micro level of the allocation methods (across countries 
and phases) suggest that MS tend to stick with the
oped in phase 1, unless these actually contradict rulings by the European Commission. 
Thus the progress made towards more efficient and more harmonized allocation rules 
is generally small. With some variation, all NAPs include persistent inefficient rules for 
closures and new installations which distort dynamic innovation incentives and tend to 
preserve existing production structures. Observed improvements include a (rather 
small) increase in auctioning and the use of benchmarking for existing and new instal-
lations. Also, the NAPs of a few old MS have simplified special provisions for process-
related emissions or combined heat and power. In contrast, new MS have often intro-
duced such provisions in phase 2.  
We conclude that potentials to improve environmental effectiveness and economic effi-
ciency are far from being tapped. Im
European Commission's review process. 
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1 Introduction* 
In January 2005, the European Union launched an EU-wide trading scheme (EU 
ETS) for CO2 emissions, covering approximately 11,500 installations from the en-
ergy industry and other carbon-intensive industry sectors. These installations ac-
count for nearly 45 % of total CO2 emissions, and about 30 % of all greenhouse 
gases in the EU (CEC 2005a). As its key climate policy instrument, the EU expects 
the EU ETS to help its Member States (MS) meet their greenhouse gas emission 
targets cost-efficiently. In the Kyoto Protocol, the EU has committed to reducing 
emissions of the greenhouse gases CO2, CH4, N2O, SF6, PFCs and HFCs by 8 % 
by 2008-2012 compared to 1990/1995 base year levels.1 In the subsequent Bur-
den-Sharing Agreement (CEC 2001), this EU-15-target was broken down into dif-
ferential targets for individual MS. The average reduction target for the ten new 
Member States is usually 8 %, with the exceptions of 6 % for Hungary and Poland, 
and no targets at all for Cyprus and Malta. The first trading period of the EU ETS 
lasts from 2005 to 2007 (phase 1). The second trading period (phase 2) runs for 
five years — as do all subsequent periods — and thus coincides with the 2008-
2012 Kyoto commitment period. 
Rationale for using emission trading to address climate change 
The prime purpose in using an emission trading system for climate policy is cost-
efficiency, i.e. to achieve a given emission target at minimum cost. The costs to 
reduce emissions will eventually be reflected in the market price for EU emission 
allowances (EUAs) and induce demand for innovative, energy/carbon saving 
processes, products and services. This increased demand should in turn lead to 
more research and development (R&D), and the invention, adoption and market 
diffusion of such innovations (dynamic efficiency). In contrast to other environ-
mental instruments, emission trading systems also assure that a particular envi-
ronmental target is met. Since the quantity of allowances allocated (emissions 
budget or cap) corresponds to the emission target for a particular period, the num-
ber of greenhouse gases emitted may not be higher than the number of allow-
ances allocated. For these reasons, emission trading systems are often consid-
ered to be superior to other regulations.  
The rate and direction of the technological change induced by the EU ETS cru-
cially depends on the design of the scheme (Gagelmann, Frondel 2005; Schleich, 
Betz 2005). The general design of the EU ETS is governed by the EU Emission 
                                            
*  The authors are indebted to Johanna Cludius, Jakob Rager and Manuel Strauch for excellent 
research assistance.  
1  The base year for CO2, CH4 and N2O is 1990; for SF6, HFCs and PFCs, it is 1995. 
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Trading Directive 2003/87/EC (CEC 2003b) and the country-specific design fea-
tures are determined by the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) of individual MS. 
The role of National Allocation Plans in the EU Emission Trading Scheme 
National Allocation Plans (NAPs) are the centrepiece of the EU ETS: at the macro 
level, NAPs state the total quantity of allowances available in each period (ET-
budget); at the micro level, they determine how these allowances will be allocated 
to individual installations.  
In order to ease the negotiations around the directive and because MS differ con-
siderably in terms of their Kyoto or burden-sharing emission targets, their reduc-
tion potentials and the progress made so far, the Directive leaves it up to the indi-
vidual MS to decide about the allocation and how their Kyoto targets are going to 
be met. Thus, at the macro level, the NAPs determine to what extent the individual 
MS may rely on the EU ETS to achieve its emission target. That is, NAPs establish 
how to “split the pie”: How many allowances should be allocated to the installa-
tions covered by the EU ETS trading sectors (i.e. from energy and industry sec-
tors), and which emission reductions are expected from sources in the household, 
services and transport sectors, which are not covered by the EU ETS (non-trading 
sectors)? The combined emission budgets for trading and non-trading sectors also 
determine to what extent MS rely on domestic efforts and on the Flexible Mecha-
nisms to meet their Kyoto targets. The Kyoto Protocol allows countries to use In-
ternational Emission Trading, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and 
Joint Implementation (JI). However, the Marrakesh Accords require that "…the use 
of the mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic action and that domestic 
action shall thus constitute a significant element of the effort made by each Party 
included in Annex I…." (UNFCCC 2001, p. 3).  
Finally, macro plans provide a first indication of the additional efforts necessary to 
meet medium- and long-term emission reduction targets. For example, the EU 
Council considers greenhouse gas emission reductions of 15-30 % (compared to 
1990 levels) by 2020 a necessary mid-term target for industrialized countries in 
order to limit the mean global temperature increase to 2° Celsius compared to pre-
industrialized levels (European Council 2005). Taking into account the projected 
increase in emissions in developing countries, many climate experts call for even 
more stringent long-term targets, e. g. 80 % reductions by 2050 for the group of 
industrialized countries (Federal Environmental Agency Germany 2006). Similarly, 
the long-term reduction targets for industrialized countries recommended by the 
March 2005 Environment Council (European Council 2005) range between 60 and 
80 % compared to 1990 levels.  
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While the size of the ET-budget at the macro level of the NAPs indicates whether 
the EU ETS is environmentally effective in terms of reducing CO2 emissions, the 
allocation rules specified at the micro level govern whether the emission reduc-
tions can be achieved at low cost to society. In particular, the allocation rules for 
existing and new installations and for closures govern incentives for innovation 
and long-term investments in low-carbon energy technologies and in energy-
efficiency in the industry sectors. In terms of distribution, the micro plan also pre-
determines the winners and losers of emission trading.  
All NAPs need to be approved by the European Commission based on the criteria 
specified, among others, in Annex III of the Emission Trading Directive (CEC 
2003b).2 The deadline for submission of phase 2 NAPs was 30 June 2006, which 
was only kept by two MS (Germany and Estonia). At the time of writing (mid-
October 2006), 16 NAPs have been submitted (Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom).3 In our analysis, we focus on 
those MS where the ET-sector accounts for substantial quantities of CO2 emis-
sions. Therefore we also include, whenever possible, data from the draft NAPs of 
Italy and Spain. At times we omit data on Cyprus and Malta, which are not subject 
to a Kyoto obligation and only have a very limited number of installations covered 
by the EU ETS. Therefore this study covers 16 NAPs and 2 draft NAPs with a total 
proposed budget of EUAs for approx. 1,892 Million EUA p.a.4 In phase 1, these 18 
countries hold 87% of all allowances allocated in the EU ETS and are likely to 
make up a similar share in phase 2.  
In this study, we provide a comprehensive first analysis and evaluation of these 
NAPs. The structure of the study is as follows: 
• Section 2 consists of the macro-level analysis. Criteria for our assessment are 
progress made by the MS towards meeting their Kyoto-targets, and compari-
sons of phase 2 ET-budget using historical emissions, the size of phase 1 ET-
budgets and projections as benchmarks. We also explore the intended use of 
Flexible Mechanisms by governments and companies. Finally, we appraise the 
split of the required emission reductions between the ET-sectors and the re-
maining sectors (including non-CO2 sources) from a cost-efficiency perspective.  
• Section 3 includes the micro-level analysis. We assess the allocation rules for 
existing and new installations, for closures and for clean technologies based on 
                                            
2  In addition, the EU Commission specified further guidance on the design of National Allocation 
plans in the so called NAP guidance (CEC 2004a; CEC 2005a). 
3  See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/2nd_phase_ep.htm. 
4  For the remainder of this report one EUA corresponds to one tonne of CO2e. 
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insights from economic theory. The micro-level analyses also cover the use of 
provisions for process-related emissions, early action, small emitters and spe-
cial reserves. These rules are also compared to the NAPs for phase 1. The 
main features of the micro plans are summarized in a comprehensive overview 
in Annex I5.  
• Section 4 concludes with an extensive summary assessment of the NAPs, 
points to areas of improved harmonization and efficiency and provides guidance 
for the future design of the EU ETS and its possible application to other sectors 
and regions.  
                                            
5  More details on the NAPs will be provided in additional summary tables under 
http://www.isi.fraunhofer.de, http://www.ceem.edu.au as well as http://www.climate-
strategies.org/. 
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2 Macro-level Analysis of National Allocation Plans 
2.1 Progress towards Kyoto: Distance-to-target analysis 
To provide some background information for assessing the ET-budgets as set in 
the NAPs we examine whether Member States are on track to meet their individual 
burden-sharing or Kyoto targets. To underline the significance of governments’ 
use of the Kyoto Mechanisms (KM), we distinguish two cases: Member States’ 
emission targets with and without relying on these mechanisms. 
Figure 1:  Kyoto burden sharing and distance-to-target analysis (in %)  
(as of 2004) 
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Source:  Fraunhofer ISI, based on UNFCCC national inventory reports and its common reporting 
format 2006 (NIR/CRF) 
The dark red bars in Figure 1 reflect each EU Member State’s burden-sharing or 
Kyoto commitment (in % of base year emission levels), while the bright yellow bars 
indicate the distance to achieving these targets as of 2004 (in %, and in MtCO2e/a 
in Figure 2). Greenhouse gas emission data are based on the most recent 
UNFCCC National Inventory Reports for 2004 (UNFCCC 2006) excluding Land-
Use, Land-Use Change & Forestry (LULUCF). According to these figures, apart 
from the new Member States which will easily manage to comply with their emis-
sion targets, only France, Greece, Sweden, and the UK have already reached 
their Kyoto target, while most other old MS require substantial additional efforts to 
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do so.6 The green bars in Figure 1 and Figure 2 reveal how this distance-to-target 
(DTT) indicator improves for Belgium, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Sweden (see FN 8), which are the MS in the sample intending to buy 
credits from Kyoto Mechanisms. In total these MS intend to purchase CERs, ERUs 
or AAUs for emissions of approx. 114 MtCO2e/a, which represents a share of 3.1% 
of the Assigned Amount of the eleven EU-15 MS7 under consideration (for the 7 
MS using KM: 8.8 % of the Assigned Amount) or 45.5 % (50.3 %) of these Mem-
ber States’ aggregate gap to reach the Kyoto target in 2004 (DTT2004 approx. -251 
MtCO2e/a, or -227 MtCO2e/a, respectively).8  
Figure 2:  Distance-to-target analysis (in MtCO2e/a) (as of 2004) 
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6  In absolute figures, Spain and Italy stand out with both missing approximately 100 MtCO2e/a, 
followed by Germany with some 43 MtCO2e/a. In terms of percentage and without considering 
the intended use of Kyoto Mechanisms, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain have the longest 
way to go to reach their Burden Sharing target. 
7  In this report we use the terms "EU-15 MS" and "old MS" interchangeably.  
8  Intended governmental use of Kyoto Mechanisms: Belgium 7 MtCO2e/a, Italy 20 MtCO2e/a, 
Ireland 3.6 MtCO2e/a, Luxembourg 4.7 MtCO2e/a, the Netherlands 20 MtCO2e/a, Spain 57 
MtCO2e/a and Sweden 1.1 MtCO2e/a. Since Sweden is on a reduction path aiming at -4%, it is 
unlikely to use these credits in 2008-12. When setting its ET-budget, Sweden did not base its 
calculations on its purchase of Kyoto Mechanisms. 
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In addition to the use of the Kyoto Mechanism on the national level by governmen-
tal purchases, the Linking Directive (CEC 2004b) allows companies to use credits 
from projects under Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) to cover their emissions under the EU ETS. Based on the supplementarity 
requirements of the Marrakesh Accords and the Kyoto Protocol, the EU ETS Di-
rective also requires that the use of these Mechanisms needs to be supplementary 
to domestic action (see Article 30.3, CEC (2004b)). In line with the Linking Direc-
tive, MS specified the use of the Mechanisms by companies as a percentage of 
allocation in their National Allocation Plans (Article 5, CEC (2004b)). Since these 
credits and EUAs can be traded without restrictions between companies, the total 
available amount within the EU-27 will be the overall limit.9 Credits from CDM and 
JI projects used by domestic firms need to be added to the amount of Kyoto Units 
(AAUs) the governments intend to use to meet their Kyoto-/Burden-Sharing tar-
gets. 
As shown in Figure 3, the maximum share (i.e., limit) of credits MS allow their 
companies to use varies substantially across countries and ranges from 4 % and 
5 % in Wallonia and Latvia, respectively, to 50 % in Ireland and Spain. There are 
also differences in how the limits will be implemented. First, some MS (e.g. UK) 
require the limits to be met in every year, but allow for banking. Other countries 
(e.g. Germany, Luxembourg) allow for banking and borrowing, so that the limit has 
to be met for the five year trading period only. Second, the limits are mainly im-
plemented at the level of installations but for some at the level of the entire ET-
sector (e.g. Slovakia) under a first-come-first-served policy. Greece permits shift-
ing these limits across companies, i.e. other operators may use the remainders of 
other installations' percentages. Flanders has implemented different limits for the 
power and industry sectors in order to compensate the power sector for a more 
stringent allocation. Since companies may trade credits from JI or CDM projects 
for EUAs, any restrictions on the use of these credits are expected to be binding at 
the aggregate level, rather than at the levels of MS, sectors, or installations.  
The sum of companies' maximum use and governments' intended purchases from 
the Kyoto Mechanisms are 403 Mt CO2e/a. This figure relates to a distance to tar-
get (as of 2004) of the 18 MS examined of some 30 Mt CO2e/a only, which clearly 
shows that for these MS – due to the intended and permitted use of KM – there 
would be no need for domestic reductions at all. Again, there are substantial dif-
ferences across MS, and some MS (notably Ireland, the Netherlands, and Luxem-
bourg) appear to be at odds with the supplementarity rule. The Netherlands plan to 
purchase up to 50 % of the remaining distance to target (DTT) externally (if based 
                                            
9  Bulgaria and Rumania will join the EU ETS in 2007.  
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on 2004 figures, this percentage increases to almost 115 %) and intend to allow 
their companies to use Kyoto Mechanisms for up to 12 % of their allocation (which 
corresponds to some 67 % of the DTT figure for 2004). However, the criteria 
specified in Article 30.3 of the EU ETS which quotes and refers to the supplemen-
tarity requirement originally formulated in the Kyoto Protocol (e.g. Article 17) and 
the Marrakesh Accords are qualitative rather than quantitative. Therefore it re-
mains to be seen to which extent the European Commission intends to apply any 
quantitative criteria, including the one it originally proposed by the EU in the inter-
national negotiations (European Council 1999) leading to the Marrakesh Ac-
cords.10
Figure 3:  Kyoto Mechanisms compliance limit for installations (in %) 
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Source:  Fraunhofer ISI, based on phase 2 NAPs 
                                            
10  The EU’s original quantitative proposal that was reached under long internal negotiations – 30 
different formulas were considered – within the EU-15 is the following: “Net acquisitions of e-
mission rights by an Annex B Party for all three Kyoto mechanisms together must not exceed 
the higher of the following two alternatives:   
Formula 1:  2
)5(
%5
ountAssignedAmemissionsbaseyear +∗
 or   
Formula 2:  )5%(50 20021994 ountAssigendAmemissions toanyyear −∗ “ (European Council 1999).   
Note: the Assigned Amount is 5 times base year emissions multiplied by the Kyoto target.
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These figures need to be kept in mind when assessing the ambition level of the 
proposed emission budgets for phase 2 of the EU ETS.  
2.2 Stringency of national ET-budgets 
The stringency of the combined national ET-budgets determines the relation be-
tween supply and demand and therefore also the prices of EUAs in the market. 
Most notably, prices for EUAs remained around € 26/EUA from January 2006 until 
the end of April 2006, but plummeted to around € 10/EUA as a response to the 
publication of verified emission data for 2005, which indicated a surplus of about 
44 million EUA for 2005 (see Figure 4, which compares actual allocation11 and 
actual emissions in 200512). Only very few countries allocated quantities of EUAs 
in 2005 below the actual 2005 emission levels of the ET-sector (Austria, Greece, 
Italy, Ireland, Spain and the UK).  
The factors leading to a generous allocation – apart from political economy as-
pects – primarily include uncertainties about the actual recent and future emission 
levels of the installations covered. For example, (i) the emission reduction levels 
compared to available historical (verified) emission levels were unknown, (ii) the 
methodologies for monitoring varied widely (EU Monitoring Guidelines had not 
been approved at the time of data collection), (iii) the definition of installations cov-
ered by the Directive did not correspond to existing sector definitions for data col-
lection (e. g. energy balances or national inventory reports), (iv) uncertainty pre-
vailed about which installations were covered by the Directive, (v) the emission 
levels at installation level used for allocation were not verified, and – maybe most 
importantly – (vi) the emission projections which determined the size of the ET-
budget in many MS relied on overly optimistic economic growth rates. Also, espe-
cially in the new MS, the average distribution of the total allocation over the trading 
period can distort the picture because of ongoing growth, thereby contributing to a 
surplus of allowances in early years of a trading phase, while the picture might 
change towards the end of that phase. Since France and Poland allowed restricted 
banking of allowances from phase 1 to the phase 2, the (lack of) stringency of the 
                                            
11  Actual allocation excludes opt-outs, includes opt-ins and new entrants in 2005 (CITL data as 
of October 23, 2006). 
12  The CITL data for Poland still only covers less than 60% of the cap set in Poland’s first NAP 
because not all installations are connected to the registry. We therefore took the cap in phase 
1 (excluding NER, 238.3 million EUA) as a proxy for the actual allocation in 2005, and esti-
mated the actual emissions of all Polish installations covered by the EU ETS by applying the 
same percentage of surplus allocation as that of the installations already registered in CITL 
(140 million EUA actual allocation vs. 113 million EUA actual emissions in 2005, yielding a 
surplus allocation of 27 million EUA or some 19% (for 461 installations)). As a result, we esti-
mate an over-allocation of approx. 46 million EUA in 2005. 
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first period may – if banking is actually implemented – have a (small) impact on the 
stringency of the second period. 
Figure 4:  Comparison of allocation 2005 vs. emissions 2005  
(in MtCO2e/a and in %) 
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Source:  Fraunhofer ISI, based on NAP and registry data (CITL as of October 23, 2006) 
 
While not all of these factors could be overcome in time to set up the second 
round of NAPs, MS and the Commission can at least rely on VET 2005 data. 
However, the time between the release of the Verified Emissions Data (May 2006) 
and the deadline to submit the NAP 2 (end of June 2006) was very short.  
To assess the stringency of the ET-budgets for NAP 2 we relate their sizes to 
three criteria which can be used to determine the cut in emissions by MS: histori-
cal emissions, the size of the ET-budgets in phase 1 and projected emissions of 
the ETS-installations for 2008-2012.  
Criterion 1: Second phase ET-budgets compared to historical emissions 
The historical emissions of the installations covered in the Member States are the 
first benchmark used to assess the stringency of ET-budgets. In principle, there 
are two sets of historical data available that might be used: CO2 emissions by the 
ET-sector in the various country-specific base periods as published in the NAPs, 
or the actual historical emissions of installations covered by the EU ETS, for which 
data is already available for the first year 2005 (VET 2005). In this study, we use 
2005 VET data, since they are the most recent, are deemed to be of higher quality 
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(verified rather than estimated) and may be consistently compared across coun-
tries. We compare these data with the ET-budget for 2008-12 (without the New 
Entrant Reserve for installations going online in 2008-12). 
However, there are three major caveats: the extended scope, opt-outs and opt-ins. 
First, the VET 2005 data do not incorporate the extended scope of the EU ETS in 
most Members States in phase 2, an outcome of the European Commission’s ef-
forts to harmonize the types of installations included in the EU ETS across coun-
tries.13 So far, these additional installations correspond to an increase of approxi-
mately 35.5 million EUA p.a. in the allocation in 2008-12.14 We therefore increase 
2005 data by these estimated additional installations. Second, some MS (the UK 
and the Netherlands) have applied opt-out rules in phase 1, so that their VET 2005 
data do not reflect the emissions of installations that have been temporarily ex-
cluded from the scheme. For phase 2, the EU ETS Directive does not foresee 
such opt-outs. As a consequence, for these two MS we correct 2005 data by the 
estimates for opt-outs.15 Third, Article 24.1 of the EU ETS Directive allows Mem-
ber States to include further sources and gases in addition to the opt-in possibili-
ties in phase 1, depending on approval by the Commission.16 In order to allow for 
consistent comparisons of the data across phases, we did not consider the alloca-
tion intended for these new opt-ins. The aforementioned data limitations should be 
kept in mind when interpreting the results. 
Criterion 2: Second phase ET-budgets compared to first phase ET-budgets 
We use the ET-budgets of phase 1 as the second benchmark to assess the strin-
gency of the ET-budgets for phase 2. For this comparison we include the reserve 
for new entrants (and reserves for other purposes, such as legal claims, but not JI 
set asides) in both ET-budgets. Also, if the ET-budget for phase 2 already includes 
                                            
13  More specifically, the NAP guidance for phase 2 states that “…Member States should there-
fore in any case include also combustion processes involving crackers, carbon black, flaring, 
furnaces and integrated steelworks, typically carried out in larger installations causing consid-
erable emissions” (CEC 2005b, p. 9). 
14  This figure is based on the following estimates provided in NAPs and supporting documents: 
Belgium 5.7 MtCO2e/a, France 5 MtCO2e/a, Germany 11 MtCO2e/a, Ireland 0.4 MtCO2e/a, the 
Netherlands 4.15 MtCO2e/a, Slovakia 1.05 MtCO2e/a, Spain 6.77 MtCO2e/a, Sweden 2 
MtCO2e/a and the UK 9.5 MtCO2e/a. Some other MS, such as Lithuania, have not yet pro-
vided a proxy for the size of emissions or the allocation to additionally covered installations. 
15  Opt-outs for the UK were approx. 30 MtCO2e/a, and for the Netherlands about 7.8 MtCO2e/a. 
16  So far, three MS (France, Netherlands and the state of Wallonia in Belgium) plan to include 
additional installations with N2O emissions from adipic and nitric acid, glyoxalic and glyoxal 
production. The intended number of allowances for N2O emissions from these opt-ins – Wal-
lonia did not provide any details yet - is rather small: France 5.44 MtCO2e/a, Netherlands 1.43 
MtCO2e/a...  
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the allocation for additional installations, we adjusted the ET-budget for phase 1 by 
the estimates for these installations that were provided in NAPs and supporting 
documents. Furthermore, both ET-budgets need to equally incorporate the fore-
seen allocation levels for opt-in and opt-out installations in phase 1. Again, we ab-
stract from allocations to additional opt-ins which might be foreseen for 2008-12 
because these additional installations have not been covered in phase 1. 
Criterion 3: Second phase ET-budgets compared to projected emissions 
Finally, to evaluate the stringency of the ET-budgets in phase 2 we also look at 
projected emissions for 2008-2012 of the installations covered by the EU ETS in 
each Member State. When available, we use the projections for the ET-sector pro-
vided in the NAPs. Where these were not included in the NAP, they were esti-
mated based on a country’s projection for all GHG from their NAP (Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Spain’s draft NAP) and the ratio of CO2 emissions of the ET-sector 
from VET 2005 (plus additional installations and phase 1 opt-outs) relative to total 
GHG emissions in 2004 (from UNFCCC 2006). This procedure implicitly assumes 
that this ratio will remain constant in phase 2 which might not be the case, espe-
cially in economies undergoing structural change. But it still represents a suffi-
ciently robust estimate of projected emissions. We used projection figures from 
external sources only if the NAP did not provide any data on projected emissions 
for 2008-12.17  
The results of the evaluation using these three criteria are displayed in Figure 5 
and Figure 6 and may be summarized as follows.  
                                            
17  For Estonia, Germany and Poland we used the recently published data from the EEA (2006) 
with which we calculated the projection for the ET-sector by using the EEA figure with the ratio 
of CO2 emissions of the ET-sector from VET 2005 (plus additional installations and opt-outs in 
phase 1) relative to total GHG emissions in 2004 (UNFCCC 2006).  
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Figure 5:  ET-budget for phase 2 compared to emissions in 2005, alloca-
tion for 2005 and emission projection in 2010 (in MtCO2e/a) 
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Note: Due to missing data on projected emissions for the ET-sectors in the NAPs for Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Estonia, Germany and Poland, criteria 3 was assessed using our own calcula-
tions (based on EEA 2006). 
Source:  Fraunhofer ISI (based on CEC 2006; UNFCCC 2006 and NAPs I+II of MS)  
1. Historical emissions in 2005 (bright yellow bar in Figure 5 and Figure 6): This 
criteria yields different results for the old MS compared to the new MS. With the 
exception of France, Luxembourg and Sweden, all EU-15 MS reduce their 
phase 2 ET-budget compared to actual emissions in 2005, while the new MS 
included in this study decided in favour of a budget larger than VET 2005 data. 
The MS with the most significant decrease of their new ET-budget compared to 
actual emissions in 2005 are Italy, Spain and the UK (both in absolute and per-
centage figures).18 Poland has the largest overshoot of 2005 emissions in ab-
solute terms, but this figure needs to be interpreted with caution as it is based 
on an estimate for 2005 data (see footnote 12). 
2. ET-budget of previous phase 2005-2007 (dark green bar in Figure 5 and Figure 
6): The same differentiation in allocation decisions between old and new MS is 
demonstrated by criteria 2. In the EU-15, only Greece and Luxembourg, and 
                                            
18  Notably, these MS were (together with Ireland and Greece) the only MS in our sample where 
allocated quantities in phase 1 were below VET data in 2005 (see Figure 4). 
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both only to a limited extent, increase their phase 2 ET-budget when compared 
to the budget in phase 1. All other EU-15 MS have decided in favour of a 
stricter ET-budget compared to the previous one. The analysis shows that, in 
absolute terms, Italy, Spain and Germany exhibit the largest reductions. In per-
centage terms, Spain, the UK and Italy show the largest cuts in their ET-
budgets. In contrast, all new MS show large upward deviations in their ET-
budgets, led by Poland (in absolute terms) and Latvia (in relative terms). 
3. Projected emissions (striped white-blue bar in Figure 5 and Figure 6): This crite-
ria again resulted in a two-sided picture: The old MS choose an ET-budget that 
is lower than projections (with the exceptions of France and Germany), while 
the new MS intend to allocate more than the projected emissions (with the ex-
ceptions of Lithuania and Slovakia). This appears particularly troublesome as 
we used projections provided in the NAP. It would be worthwhile to compare 
projections in the NAPs with expert judgements because projected figures are 
always somewhat subjective and thus the picture might be even worse (see 
Neuhoff et al. 2006). 
Figure 6:  ET-budget for phase 2 compared to emissions in 2005, allocation for 
2005 and emission projection in 2010 (in %) 
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Source:  Fraunhofer ISI (based on CEC 2006; UNFCCC 2006 and NAPs I+II of MS)  
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Only six MS, all of them EU-15, fulfil all three criteria, namely Belgium, Ireland, 
Italy, Spain (the latter two according to their draft NAPs), the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom.  
In total terms, criteria 1 (ET-budget phase 1 vs. VET 2005) suggests that the new 
total ET-budget of the EU ETS is just below 2.7 % or some 46 million EUA p.a. 
below actual emissions in 2005 (old MS: -11.1 % or -158.9 MtCO2e/a; new MS: 
+31.3 % or 112.8 MtCO2e/a). Criteria 2 (ET-budget phase 2 vs. ET-budget phase 
1) provides a similar picture, again with a clear distinction between new and old 
MS: the 18 MS under consideration have set their ET-budgets 3 % or approx. 57 
million EUA p.a. below the phase 1 ET-budget (old MS: -7.7 % or -122.8 million 
EUA p.a.; new MS: +21 % or 65.7 million EUA p.a.). Finally, the overall picture for 
criteria 3 (ET-budget phase 2 vs. projections) shows very similar results: the phase 
2 E-budget of old MS is approx. 9.1 % or 138 million EUA p.a. lower than the pro-
jection, while the new MS intend to allocate approx. 21.1 % or 80.4 million EUA 
p.a. more than projected emissions. In sum, the overall ET-budget of the 18 MS 
under investigation is just 3 % or 57.6 million EUA p.a. lower than projected emis-
sions for the ET-sector.  
These figures suggest that the intended allocation for the ET-sector in 2008-12 will 
not require significant reductions – given the error of margin on the data, actual 
emissions may even be well below the intended allocation. As a consequence, the 
price for EUAs and innovation incentives for low-carbon technologies are likely to 
be low as well. 
2.3 Cost-efficiency of ET-budget 
While the first three criteria address the stringency – or lack thereof – of the ET-
budgets for the installations covered by the EU ETS, we now examine to which 
extent Member States rely on the EU ETS to meet their Kyoto burden-sharing tar-
gets. In particular, we attempt to gain some insights into whether the sizes of the 
EU ET-budgets are consistent with an efficient distribution of reduction efforts be-
tween the trading and the non-trading sectors. 
Cost efficient size of budget for ET-sector 
From an economic perspective, the size of the budgets for the ET-sector and the 
non-ET-sector should be determined such that (before international trading starts) 
the total abatement costs are minimized, i.e. that the marginal costs of the abate-
ment measures which are realized in the trading sectors and the non-trading sec-
tors are equal. Thus, sectors with cheaper reduction measures should contribute 
more reductions (relatively) to achieving a country’s emission target. At least to 
some extent, criterion 3 of Annex III of the EU ETS Directive – i.e. the potential to 
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reduce emissions – addresses this issue. According to the NAP Guidance (CEC 
2004a), this “criterion will be deemed as fulfilled if the allocation reflects the rela-
tive differences in the potential between the total covered and total non-covered 
activities”, where “potential” also means economic, and not only technical poten-
tial. 
Criterion 4: Hypothetical allocation scenario (HAS) between ET- and non ET-
sectors for 2008-12 
As an indicator for the relative contribution of the ET-sector to achieving a coun-
try’s emission target, we relate the size of the ET-budget in the NAPs to a “hypo-
thetical allocation scenario between ETS and non-ETS” (HAS). To calculate this 
HAS we multiply a Member State’s burden-sharing or Kyoto target with the share 
of the ET-sector’s CO2-emissions relative to total greenhouse gas emissions (us-
ing the most recent data of 2004/05).19 Thus, the HAS represents the budget re-
sulting for the trading sector (biggest parts of energy and industry) if all sectors 
contributed proportionally to achieving a country’s emission target. In principle, the 
same caveats as described in the previous criteria apply with respect to calculating 
the share of ETS emissions relative to all GHG emissions. For example, estimates 
rather than verified emission data had to be used for installations which were 
opted out in phase 1 but are to be included in phase 2 of the EU ETS. 
In our analyses of the HAS of MS purchasing Kyoto Mechanisms (Belgium, Italy, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden20), we distinguish two 
scenarios: a domestic action scenario where we calculate the HAS without the 
governments’ intended use of Kyoto mechanisms; and a scenario where these 
mechanisms result in an increase in the national emission budgets (and conse-
quently also in the HAS).  
                                            
19  To compute the share of the ET-sector we divide total (verified) CO2-emissions from the ET-
installations in 2005 (CEC 2006) – adjusted upwards by emissions of additional installations 
and opt-outs – by the total GHG emissions of a country using National Inventory Data for 2004 
(UNFCCC 2006), excluding (as always) emissions from LULUCF. 
20  The second scenario is not relevant for Sweden because – although it intends to purchase 
credits from Kyoto mechanisms – the decision on the actual use of these credits for 2008-12 is 
still pending, and the amount intended to be purchased was not taken into account when set-
ting Sweden’s ETS-cap for phase 2. 
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Figure 7:  ET-budget for phase 2 compared to “hypothetical allocation  
scenario” (in MtCO2e/a) 
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Source:  Fraunhofer ISI (based on CEC 2006; UNFCCC 2006 and NAPs I+II of MS) 
Figure 8 shows the results for the shares of the actual ET-budgets to the HAS. 
Apart from the UK, the emission budgets for the ET-sectors in all other Member 
States are significantly larger than a proportional contribution would suggest. Even 
if the governments’ intended use of the Kyoto mechanisms is taken into account, 
in addition to the UK only the ET-budgets of the Netherlands and Spain pass this 
test. In terms of cost-efficiency, this result insinuates that the “pie split” is not opti-
mal in most countries. According to many studies (including Böhringer et al. 2005; 
Böhringer et al. 2006; Criqui, Kitous 2003; or Peterson 2006), the marginal abate-
ment costs of the ET-sector are lower than the abatement costs of other sectors in 
the economy (even without considering the ETS-companies' option to use “cheap” 
credits from CDM or JI projects to fulfil their obligation under the EU ETS). Thus, 
from a cost-efficiency perspective, the ET-sectors should actually contribute more 
than would be proportional rather than less.  
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Figure 8:  ET-budget for phase 2 compared to “hypothetical allocation sce-
nario” (in MtCO2e/a) 
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Source:  Fraunhofer ISI (based on CEC 2006; UNFCCC 2006 and NAPs I+II of MS) 
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3 Analysis of allocation rules at the micro level 
Similar to phase 121 of the EU ETS, most MS included in this study also allocate 
the entire ET-budget for free in phase 2 (see Annex I). Likewise, the majority of 
MS again apply a two step approach to determine the quantities of EUAs to be 
allocated to individual installations. In the first step, sector budgets (SB) are de-
termined, usually based on a combination of historical emission levels or average 
benchmarks, growth projections, emission saving potentials (EF = efficiency fac-
tor) and a compliance factor (CF) to reach the overall ET-budget. In the second 
step, the sector budgets are then allocated to individual installations (IA = installa-
tion allocation), typically based on their emissions share in a base period (rather 
than on output or capacity). Technically, most old MS apply sector-specific compli-
ance factors (see Annex I) to guarantee the consistency of the bottom-up alloca-
tion to individual installations with the sector budgets. In the simplest case, there 
are only two budgets: one for energy and one for industry.22 Since most of the new 
MS (e.g. Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia) will easily reach their Kyoto-targets, they 
use a one step approach and do not have to apply compliance factors. In all MS 
these basic allocation rules are supplemented by special provisions to serve par-
ticular distributional purposes, for example, to account for clean technologies, 
process-related emissions, early action or small emitters. In addition, the micro 
plans include limits on the use of Kyoto Mechanisms by companies and may also 
provide information on special reserves. In the remainder of this section, we will 
analyse the allocation rules for existing installations, for new projects (including 
new entrant reserves) and for closures in more detail, drawing primarily on argu-
ments from economic theory. The section also covers special provisions and spe-
cial reserves. 
3.1 Basic allocation rules for existing installations 
As can be seen from Annex I, most MS allocate allowances to existing installations 
for free based on historical emissions in a fairly recent base period which typically 
consists of several years (conventional grandfathering).23 But several countries 
like Belgium, Italy, Latvia, Spain, Sweden and the UK base allocation for some 
                                            
21  For overviews see, for example, Betz et al. (2004), Ecofys (2004), German Emissions Trading 
Authority (DEHSt) (2005), Matthes (2005). 
22  In some countries the energy sector only includes power installations connected to the grid. In 
other MS, the energy sector also includes power installations in the industry sector (see Annex 
I for an overview). For simplicity we usually do not make this distinction when presenting the 
general results. 
23  Conventional grandfathering is also the method applied in most other existing emission trading 
systems, see e. g. Boemare and Quirion (2002). 
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existing installations on benchmarks (BM) and France and Poland use average 
benchmarks to determine the size of the sector budgets. Apart from France, these 
countries did not use benchmarks to allocate EUAs to existing installations in 
phase 1. Under benchmarking, allocation is based on specific emission values per 
unit of production (e.g. kg CO2/MWh electricity or t CO2/t cement clinker) for a par-
ticular group of products or installations. The actual number of allowances can be 
derived from the specific benchmark multiplied by past or predicted activity rates of 
individual installations. In general, a benchmarking allocation on installation level 
favours carbon-efficient installations compared to less carbon-efficient installa-
tions, since operators of the latter need to purchase missing allowances on the 
market or have fewer excess allowances. Since average benchmarks are calcu-
lated as the activity-weighted average of emission values for a particular group, 
they are politically more palatable to existing installations than benchmarks based 
on the best-available technology (BAT-benchmarks). Benchmarks may be uni-
formly applied to all installations in a group or differentiated according to fuel in-
puts, technologies or products. Both types of benchmarks may be associated with 
high distributional effects compared to conventional grandfathering. Benchmarks 
to determine the sector budget will not have those effects, if allocation at the level 
of installations is based on the share of historic emissions.24
The majority of benchmarks are fuel and/or technology-specific average bench-
marks rather than uniform benchmarks or BAT benchmarks.25 Exceptions include 
Flanders and Wallonia in Belgium, where a uniform BAT-benchmark is applied for 
power installations, and Sweden, where allocation for basic oxygen steel furnaces 
is based on an EU-wide average benchmark. 
Assessment: benchmarking versus grandfathering for existing installations 
As long as full auctioning is not feasible (see next sub-section), benchmarking may 
be preferable to conventional grandfathering. In particular, conventional grand-
fathering may lead to undesirable distributional effects, since companies investing 
in abatement measures prior to the base period (early action) receive fewer allow-
ances than those who did not invest in such measures. The latter companies are 
then able to reduce emissions at lower costs and sell the surplus allowances on 
                                            
24  Note that if the emission budget for a particular group of installations is fixed, then a BM allo-
cation implies that the allocation to an installation is in proportion to the share of the activity 
level of that installation. In particular, the allocation to an installation is independent of the level 
of the benchmark. 
25  The Netherlands Flanders and Wallonia, where allocation is based on Covenants or voluntary 
agreements use BAT-benchmarks for existing installations. However, as in phase 1, they use 
benchmarks for calculating the efficiency factor (i.e. difference between BAT and actual effi-
ciency) which is used in the allocation formula (see Annex I).  
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the market. This problem could arise in future trading periods if base periods are 
updated to calculate allocation at the installation-level (Bode 2006). To limit the 
distributional effects, the benchmarks used for existing installations could be dif-
ferentiated according to fuel use, technologies, installation size or application (e.g. 
load). Such differentiated benchmarks are generally likely to result in efficiency 
losses and higher overall mitigation costs; however, these losses would be smaller 
for existing installations (compared with new installations). As argued, for example, 
by Cremer and Schleich (2006), in the EU ETS, benchmarking could also provide 
additional incentives for modernization (compared with conventional grandfather-
ing). For installations receiving fewer free allowances under benchmarking than 
under conventional grandfathering, benchmarking provides a higher incentive for 
substitution of inefficient installations if closures of installations lead to a termina-
tion of allocation (see also section 3.4 on closures). The tighter the benchmark, the 
higher this incentive would be. Finally, benchmarking would facilitate comparison 
across EU MS and may be seen as a first step towards harmonized allocation 
rules throughout the EU (Kruger, Pizer 2004). In fact, EU-wide benchmarks could 
also be used to determine the allowance budget at the sector level. Such a proce-
dure would contribute to levelling the playing field for allocation. 
The potential drawbacks of benchmarking include more stringent data require-
ments and the need to build benchmark groups (see, for example, Radov et al. 
2005). Also, distributional effects, which may be high even if differentiated bench-
marks are used, may render benchmarks politically infeasible compared to con-
ventional grandfathering (Cremer, Schleich 2006). In phase 1, distributional as-
pects and the lack of sufficient data prevented the use of benchmarks for existing 
installations in many countries. In the NAP guidance for phase 2, the European 
Commission stated that “EU-wide benchmarking is not a sufficiently matured allo-
cation method to be used for phase 2. Member States may however find appropri-
ate use for benchmarking at national level for the installation level allocation in cer-
tain sectors and for new entrants, e.g. in the electricity sector.” (CEC 2005b, p. 8). 
The power sector, which is responsible for the vast majority of emissions in the EU 
ETS, seems particularly well suited to benchmarking since its output is fairly ho-
mogenous and it is easy to assign installations to benchmarking groups.  
3.2 Auctioning 
While in phase 1 of the EU ETS, only four MS (Denmark, Hungary, Ireland and 
Lithuania) chose to auction off parts of their ET-budget (with an annual total of only 
4.5 million EUAs), the analyses of the submitted NAPs for phase 2 suggest that 
more MS will do so. Similarly, the shares will usually be larger but tend to be well 
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below the maximum share of 10 % allowed by the ETS Directive in phase 2.26 
More specifically, in our sample of 18 NAPs, seven include auctioning for phase 2, 
ranging from a share of 0.5 % in Ireland and Flanders to 7 % in the UK. In five of 
those MS there was no auctioning in phase 1.27 Compared to the first period 
where the total number of EUAs auctioned p.a. is 4.5 million, this share is now 
about 24.5 million EUAs which correspond to 1.3 % of the ET-budgets (incl. re-
serves) for the MS included in this survey. The auction share would have been 
even higher if the French NAP, which now shows an auction share of zero, had 
kept the high share of up to 10 % as originally proposed in the draft NAP. The cur-
rent NAPs provide sufficient information on the intended use of the revenues, but 
no information is given on the actual auctioning rules such as types, timing or fre-
quency. In Flanders, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Poland auction revenues are 
supposed to finance further emission reductions internally or externally (via buying 
Kyoto units); in the Netherlands they are to benefit “low-volume users” of electricity 
in the ET-sector and other sectors (Dutch NAPII, p. 14), and in Ireland to finance 
the scheme’s administrative costs. Poland and Luxembourg have plans to restrict 
participation in the auction to domestic operators, but this may violate EU competi-
tion regulations.  
Assessment: auctioning versus free allocation  
While the method of allocation does not – at least under ideal conditions such as 
the absence of market power – affect the market price for EUAs, participating 
companies are better off if allowances are allocated for free, since their wealth in-
creases by the total value of these allowances. Thus allocating all allowances free 
of charge is politically more palatable which may explain the observed low shares 
of the ET-budgets that MS intend to auction off.  
Auctioning off all allowances could avoid most, if not all, problems and distribu-
tional aspects which result in inefficient and complex rules in several Member 
States, for example those accounting for early action, expected growth or excess 
allocation28, or for the treatment of new installations and closures (see subsequent 
sections for further details). Thus, if all allowances were auctioned off, the NAPs 
                                            
26  In phase 1, a maximum 5 % of the ET-budget may be auctioned. 
27 Since at the time of writing (October 2006) there was no NAP 2 available for Denmark, it could 
not be determined whether Denmark is continuing to use auctioning for phase 2. The draft 
NAP for Hungary includes an auctioning share of 5 %. 
28  To prevent excess allocation some MS (Austria, Germany) had included so called ex-post 
adjustments of the allocation in phase 1. Since ex-post adjustments are at odds with the logic 
of emission trading (ex-ante principle of allocation), the European Commission has ruled 
against them.  
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would be much simpler, more transparent and more efficient. In addition, the out-
come of an auction may be perceived as “fair” because – in contrast to a free allo-
cation of allowances- the “polluter-pays" principle holds.  
Auctioning off part of the budget right at the beginning of the trading period may 
also generate robust early price signals for the actual scarcity in the market, since 
participants base their bidding behaviour on their marginal abatement costs (and 
expected prices in the secondary market). For example, Schmalensee et al. 
(1998) conclude that the auction share within the existing US EPA SO2 Trading 
System facilitated the price discovery process and the development of the market. 
Similarly, based on results from “experimental” emission trading simulations with 
companies, Ehrhart et al. (2005) concur that auctioning off part of the ET-budget 
would generate an early price indicator, which would help participants develop 
their investment and trading strategies and thus lead to lower costs to society. 
Hepburn et al. (2006) argue that auctioning off and setting a minimum price (price 
floor) could lead to higher investor certainty.   
Auctioning off allowances would also address “windfall profits”. Since companies 
try to pass on any additional marginal costs (opportunity costs) associated with 
emissions (i.e. price of allowances) to customers, extra profits (windfall profits) ac-
crue if allowances are allocated for free.29 In principle, whether allowances are 
auctioned off or allocated for free does not alter the opportunity costs (of additional 
emissions), but leads to very different outcomes in terms of the distribution of the 
scarcity rents associated with allowances. It should also be noted that, at least 
from a theoretical perspective, market power may result in higher or lower in-
creases in the product price in response to the introduction of the EU ETS com-
pared to perfect competition. The outcome depends, among other things, on the 
shape of the demand curve. In any case, empirical observations suggest that the 
power sector, which faces a fairly inelastic demand (at least in the short run), has 
managed to pass on a large part of the opportunity costs to its customers. As a 
consequence, the power sector was able to secure high windfall profits. Estimates 
of the pass-through rates are generally high. According to Sijm et al. (2006), these 
rates vary between 60 and 100 %, depending on the country, market structure, 
demand elasticity and CO2 price considered. Clearly, windfall profits would disap-
pear if allowances were auctioned off and inefficiencies would be reduced as well. 
Free allocation may also provide incentives to exert market power in the EUA 
market resulting in higher prices for EUAs and product output. In particular, com-
                                            
29  Note that opportunity cost pricing is not only sensible from an economic perspective, it is also 
essential for an ETS to send the correct price signals to provide adequate incentives to save 
emissions and to minimize total reduction costs. Thus, any attempts to directly regulate the 
price for EUAs, for example by setting a cap, would be counterproductive. 
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panies' profits in the product market (e.g. electricity) would rise if prices for EUAs 
increased (above competitive prices) and if these increases could be passed on to 
consumers (Misiolek, Elder 1989). The observation that the price for EUAs in the 
(rather thin) spot market did not drop to zero, but instead remained around or 
above 10 to 15 € per EUA once excess allocation became common knowledge, is 
consistent with this view.30  
Although not all countries use auctioning, most of the old EU MS address windfall 
profits by splitting the reduction burden unequally between industry and energy 
sectors. In principle, Germany, Italy, the UK and Sweden, for example, determine 
the size of the budget for the power sector as the residual of the ET-budget once 
allocation to other installations has been determined. The Netherlands apply an 
additional specific reduction factor of 0.15 to existing power installations to correct 
for windfall profits.  
To sum up, for the reasons described above, MS should auction off as many 
EUAs as feasible under the current rules of the ETS Directive. In the future, the 
auction share should be 100 %. The auction revenues could also be used for other 
purposes, such as reducing distorting taxes leading to a “double dividend”: im-
proved environmental quality and higher employment and/or GDP.31
3.3 Allocation rules for new projects 
As was already the case in phase 1, in the second period all MS establish a New 
Entrant Reserve to allocate allowances to new projects (i.e. new installations and 
capacity extensions of existing installations) for free, usually on a first-come-first-
served basis. The only exceptions are non-CHP plants in the Swedish power sec-
tor which have to buy all their allowances on the market. As in phase 1, gratis allo-
cation in most MS is typically based on BAT-values for individual installations or on 
BAT-benchmarks for homogenous products (or technologies). Benchmarks are 
common in the energy sector, where they tend to be differentiated by fuel inputs. 
So far only Luxembourg, Sweden, Flanders and Wallonia in Belgium and the UK 
are applying uniform benchmarks. If BAT-benchmarks are used for new projects in 
industry sectors, they tend to be technology-specific, and often assume gas as the 
fuel input (e.g. Latvia, UK). Sometimes, product groups are further split into sub-
groups (e.g. different types of tiles or glass in Germany). France, which has ap-
                                            
30  Of course, there are alternative or complementary explanations including uncertainty about 
future demand or regulatory uncertainty from pending legal procedures concerning allocation 
rules in several MS.  
31  Recently, the US State of Virginia auctioned off NOx allowances with the explicit intention of 
maximizing government revenue.  
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plied average benchmarks for allocation to new projects in phase 1, now also 
plans to draw on BAT-benchmarks.  
Assessment: allocation rules for new projects 
Neither the Emission Trading Directive nor the NAP-Guidance make any recom-
mendations on how new projects should be treated, even though the Commission 
would have preferred newcomers to buy allowances on the market, e.g. European 
Commission DG Environment (CEC 2003a). In principle, three methods are ac-
ceptable under the Directive: auctioning from a set-aside reserve, a purchase of 
EUAs on the market, or free allocation (from a reserve for new entrants). The logic 
of emission trading requires that all allowances for new projects be purchased at 
market prices, since investment decisions may then be based on the full social 
costs (i.e. private costs plus environmental cost). As already pointed out by Spul-
ber (1985), allocating allowances for free to new projects amounts to subsidizing 
investments (and output), and thus increases – ceteris paribus – the total costs to 
society of achieving climate targets.  
Having to buy allowances for new projects on the secondary market or at an auc-
tion would provide strong monetary incentives to implement energy-efficient, low-
carbon technologies since these technologies require the purchase of fewer allow-
ances. In contrast, if new projects receive free allowances, the incentives to use 
technologies with least emissions are weaker and depend on the actual allocation 
rules. Allocating allowances for new projects based on uniform BAT-benchmarks 
and uniform standardized projections of production or utilization rates for homoge-
nous products would only be second best. In this case, investments in technolo-
gies which generate fewer specific emissions than the benchmark generate extra 
allowances that may be sold on the market. Thus, uniform benchmarks create 
strong incentives to invest in the most efficient technology within a given product 
group, independent of the level of the benchmark. In contrast, technologies which 
are less efficient than the benchmark cause additional costs through the purchase 
of allowances. Any additional differentiation (e.g. by fuels, processes, or by utiliza-
tion rates) implies additional subsidization of particular installations and further 
reduces the cost-saving potential of the EU ETS. In particular, the more sub-
benchmarks there are within a product group or within a technology group, the 
smaller the innovation effects, since innovation incentives are limited to the sub-
groups.  
As shown in Neuhoff et al. (2006), the allocated quantities of EUAs would vary 
substantially even for the same technologies and identical fuels for MS applying 
BAT-benchmarks for allocation to new power plants. To a large extent, these dif-
ferences are the result of differences in the BAT-values and activity rates applied 
(projected output, standardized load factors). Thus, inefficiencies not only arise 
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from differentiated benchmarks but also from differences in the activity rates used. 
Ideally, to avoid this additional source of inefficiency, identical activity rates would 
have to be used for all technologies or fuels. For example, Germany, Luxemburg 
and the UK apply the same activity rates for allocation to all power installations 
(connected to the grid) of 7500 hours, 6500 hours and 5600 hours, respectively. In 
addition, there are differences in the compliance factors applied to new projects 
across MS (e.g. Wallonia, Spain, UK), if used at all for new projects. Thus, to avoid 
possible competition distortion across MS arising from the different rules of alloca-
tion to new projects, not only the benchmark levels but also the applied activity 
rates and the compliance factors would have to be harmonized across MS.  
From a distributional point of view, the increased use of standardized activity rates 
in phase 2 compared to phase 1 also avoids the risk of "optimistic" projections by 
operators. Such installation-specific projections are primarily found in the NAPs of 
new MS. Germany has switched from relying on such individual projections to 
standardized utilisation rates. However, if these rates are rather high – as, for ex-
ample, for energy installations in the German power and some industry sectors32 – 
the use of standardized rates does not necessarily conserve the NER.  
Assessment: NER – size and rules 
If new entrants receive allowances for free, the amount of the reserve needs to be 
determined and rules drawn up on how to proceed if the reserve is too large (can-
cel remaining allowances, sell them on the market) or too small (e.g. first-come-
first-served, buy further allowances to replenish the reserve). 
The reserves vary substantially in size (see Annex I) ranging from circa 2 % of the 
ET-budget in Germany to approximately 45 % in Latvia. Germany again plans to 
replenish its NER reserve if it proves to be too small. In this case, an independent 
agency will purchase a sufficient amount of allowances on the market so that all 
new entrants receive allowances for free; part of the reserve in the third trading 
period will be earmarked to finance the agency. A similar set-up exists in Lithuania 
and Luxembourg, while France and the Netherlands may follow. Installations 
which would have to buy all their allowances on the market include non-CHP 
plants in the Swedish power sector, and also new entrants in MS where the NER 
is too small and no replenishment mechanism exists.  
In cases where the NER turns out to be too large, some countries like the UK and 
Poland will auction off their surplus, while others like Germany and Ireland intend 
to cancel any surplus allowances from the ET-budget. However, some countries 
                                            
32  For example, the standardized load factors in all gas and coal fired power plants (except for 
gas turbines) in the power sector correspond to 7500 hrs. 
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like France, Latvia, the Netherlands and Sweden have not yet made a final deci-
sion on what they would do with a surplus in the NER. As in phase 1, where sev-
eral new MS with rather large NERs failed to publish provisions for a surplus in 
their reserve, this situation translates into uncertainty about the supply of EUAs.  
Finally, for some countries (France, Latvia and Lithuania), it seems not clear from 
the NAPs whether the size of the NER was determined by adding projected growth 
at the aggregate level and bottom-up information on planned new installations or 
capacity expansions. Clearly, this would amount to double counting leading to in-
flated NERs.  
3.4 Allocation rules for closures 
In most MS, the distribution of allowances ends with the year an installation 
closes. For phase 2, Cyprus, Flanders and Malta among others, joined Germany, 
Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK which continue to in-
clude so called transfer rules. To provide additional incentives for investments, a 
transfer rule allows the allocated allowances for a closed installation to be reas-
signed to a new installation. In most countries, allowances may only be transferred 
to the same activity or product (e.g. Germany, Poland), in some countries to the 
same operator, while countries like Cyprus or Greece require both these criteria to 
be met. MS continue to struggle with regard to the formal definition of a closure, 
and definitions vary widely across MS. 
Assessment: closure rules 
From an economic perspective, terminating the allocation of EUAs after a closure 
results in (economic) inefficiencies and disincentives for new investments. Since 
the opportunity costs of a closure are not accounted for properly, old plants may 
continue to be operated too long and new investments may be postponed. In fact, 
stopping allocation for closures corresponds to an output subsidy, and there will be 
too many companies in the market (Graichen, Requate 2005; Spulber 1985).33
The Emission Trading Directive requires that allowances can only be allocated to 
installations which operate under a permit to emit greenhouse gases (Article 11 in 
combination with Article 4, CEC 2004b). Thus, if closed installations cease to ad-
here to the permit or no longer hold a permit to emit GHG, allowances may no 
longer be allocated to that installation. Technically, the ETS Directive would have 
                                            
33  For example, the US EPA Acid Rain program for SO2 and NOx from power plants is governed 
by more efficient allocation rules for closures, and also for new entrants: closure of a plant will 
not terminate allocation and new projects need to purchase allowances on the market or via 
auctions. Linking allocation to operators as is practised in this program would have facilitated 
more efficient rules for closures and new entrants in the EU ETS. 
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allowed independent permits for operation and for GHG emissions. Then, a clo-
sure would not have resulted in a loss in the permit to emit GHGs and allocation 
could have continued. In practice, however, most if not all MS decided to link exist-
ing operating permits with the permit to emit GHGs. In some MS a tight schedule 
for implementing the ETS Directive in phase 1 may have prevented the required 
changes in legislation. Also, MS may have been concerned that operators might 
shutdown their installations, keep the allocation, and open a new plant in another 
country. For phase 2, no change could be observed in the national implementa-
tions of the permit rules.  
3.5 Other special features 
Combined heat and power (CHP) 
As in phase 1, several MS decided to include special provisions for clean tech-
nologies in phase 2, notably for new combined heat and power (CHP) plants but in 
some cases also for existing CHP (see Annex I). The number and types of rules to 
compensate existing CHP even increased. In phase 2 they include applying a dif-
ferent compliance factor (e.g. Belgium, Germany, Greece, Sweden and the UK) or 
a bonus (e.g. Lithuania), excluding CHP from special cuts to account for windfall 
profits (e.g. NL), special early action provisions for CHP (e.g. Estonia) or a “double 
benchmark” for heat and electricity (e.g. Latvia, Poland). Double benchmarks are 
used by other MS (e.g. Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania and Luxembourg) for 
new CHP plants only. Some MS (e.g. the UK, Wallonia and Flanders in Belgium) 
apply a less stringent compliance factor to new CHP installations. Finally, some 
MS which allocate gratis allowances to new projects on a first-come-first-served 
basis have established a special reserve for new CHP plants only (e.g. UK, Ire-
land). 
Early action 
Allocating allowances based on a recent base period implies that companies 
which invested in reductions prior to the base period will receive fewer allowances 
compared to those which did not invest. Therefore some countries (e.g. the Czech 
Republic, Germany and Hungary) included special provisions such as a higher 
compliance factor or an early action bonus to directly account for this so-called 
“early action” in phase 1, since the lack of data prevented the use of earlier base 
periods. A larger number of MS accounted for early action in a more indirect way 
by using longer or earlier base periods (e.g. Ireland, Luxembourg and Slovenia), 
applying efficiency factors (e.g. Netherlands, Italy) or benchmarks (France). In 
phase 2, none of the old EU-15 Member States accounts for any new early action 
in a direct way (Germany has retained the Early Action rules for those installations 
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which were subject to the rules in phase 1). Only some of the new MS (Estonia 
and Poland) have kept special early action rules and Lithuania has even intro-
duced a special early action bonus although it did not directly account for early 
action in phase 1.  
Process-related emissions 
The reduction of process-related emissions is believed to be either very expensive 
or technically not feasible for many applications, at least in the short term. There-
fore, in phase 1 of the EU ETS, some MS have special provisions for installations 
with a higher proportion of process-related emissions (e.g. lime, cement clinker, 
steel or glass). These provisions may be applied either at the level of individual 
installations via less stringent compliance factors here (e.g. Germany), or at the 
level of sectors (e.g. France, UK) in the first phase. Most countries continue their 
special treatment of process-related emissions in phase 2 as before. Only Ger-
many has switched from an installation-level to a sector-level approach and Lux-
embourg no longer has a special CF for process-based emissions but instead 
uses a uniform CF for all emissions and all sectors. Two MS, the Netherlands and 
Lithuania have introduced new, special rules for process-related emissions. 
Treatment of small emitters  
The inclusion of small emitters in the EU ETS has often been criticized on effi-
ciency grounds (e.g. Betz, Ancev 2006). In particular, it was questioned whether 
the overall benefits from including small emitters would justify the transaction costs 
for data collection, reporting, monitoring and verifying (RMV) emissions, actual 
trading etc. In phase 1, only a few countries used the opt-out provisions of the ETS 
Directive (Art. 27) for small emitters. In particular, the Netherlands exempted emit-
ters with annual emissions below 25,000 t CO2e/a from participating in phase 1 of 
the EU ETS.34 But starting from phase 2 onwards, the ETS Directive no longer 
allows opting-out. In the NAPs for phase 2, several EU-15 countries have intro-
duced provisions to either exclude or compensate small-scale installations. For 
example, the UK and the Flemish region in Belgium apply a de minimis threshold 
for installations below 3 MW and for emergency plants if there is no installation on 
the site exceeding 20MWth 35. The aggregation rule for capacities (Annex I, EU 
                                            
34  It should be noted though that installations with low emissions are not necessarily small or 
owned by small companies. In particular, energy installations may be large but operated du-
ring peak hours or as reserve capacity only. Likewise, they may be only one of several power 
plants operated by a large utility. 
35  An emergency or stand-by installation may be excluded from the aggregation if it is proven 
that it cannot be physically operated at the same time (UK NAP p. 48 and Flemish NAP p. 19).  
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ETS Directive) is not applied to these installations. The Netherlands interpret the 
aggregation rule in such a way that it applies only to a site where at least one in-
stallation exceeds 20MWth but not sites where several installations are below this 
threshold. If each individual installation is below 20 MWth but would exceed 
20 MWth in the aggregate, their operators may choose to include these installa-
tions in the EU ETS voluntarily. Finally, in Germany, the allocation for installations 
with average base period emissions below 25,000 t CO2e/a is subject to a compli-
ance factor of 1.0 rather than 0.9875 (industry, CHP) or 0.85 (power sector).36
In terms of the distribution of allowances, exempting 50 % of the smallest installa-
tions would still leave 98 % of the allowances in the EU ETS (e.g. Betz, Ancev 
2006). Thus, a threshold in the ETS Directive based on emissions rather than on 
installed capacity (20 MWth) might have been more appropriate from the very be-
ginning. Since starting this process prior to phase 2 would have put other regula-
tions in the ETS Directive at risk, the European Commission decided not to pro-
ceed in this respect. Also, as for example argued by (Buchner et al. 2006), some 
of the transaction costs are sunk (historical data collection), reduced over time 
(RMV) or may be lowered by outsourcing. Thus, the economics for judging 
whether small emitters should be included have changed since phase 1. In addi-
tion, alternative regulations would also incur transaction costs. So far, there is no 
broad empirical basis for a conclusive assessment on whether to include or ex-
clude small emitters. 
Special reserves 
Some of the new Member States (e.g. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) have 
included "set-asides" in their NAPs to avoid double counting for JI projects. These 
reserves are a requirement under the Linking Directive to avoid possible double 
counting if JI projects in these countries reduce CO2 emissions from installations 
covered by the ETS Directive. These projects would generate ERUs and free up 
EUAs. The data from several MS (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) suggest 
that the JI reserves have simply been added to the overall allocation. Since an 
equivalent number of EUAs has not been subtracted from the ET-budget, double-
counting has not been avoided and thus leads to inflated ET-budgets in these 
countries.  
Several former EU-15 MS also created special reserves to cover additional alloca-
tions resulting from legal claims (e.g. NL: 0.5 million EUA p.a. and UK: 0.47 million 
                                            
36  At least at first glance, Slovakia's plan to introduce a separate scheme for small emitters is 
surprising, but cannot be assessed in more depth because there is no detailed information 
available as yet. 
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EUA p.a.). It is questionable whether these reserves can be approved since legal 
claims – if not finalized before the actual allocation – may require ex-post alloca-
tions which are opposed by the European Commission. 
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4 Conclusions  
In this section we summarize the main results of the macro and micro level analy-
ses and offer recommendations for the future design of the EU ETS and possibly 
other emission trading schemes. 
I) Macro level 
At the macro level, the distance-to-target analyses for the NAPs included in this 
study suggest that the new MS will easily manage to achieve their Kyoto-targets 
without further efforts. Among the EU-15 MS, only France, Greece, Sweden, and 
the UK have already reached their Burden-Sharing target, while most of the others 
will have to make substantial additional efforts to do so. To a large extent, the 
missing gap will be bridged by government purchases of significant quantities of 
credits from Kyoto Mechanisms, but some countries (e.g. Spain) also require 
additional domestic efforts. In total, the governments of Belgium, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden intend to purchase credits cor-
responding to about 114 MtCO2e/a, which represents a share of 3.1 % of the As-
signed Amount or 45.5 % of the eleven old EU Member States’ aggregate gap to 
reach the Kyoto target (as of 2004). Assuming a price of 15 €/t CO2e, these figures 
correspond to about 1.7 billion € p.a. which would have to be financed by the fed-
eral budgets. In addition, almost all MS also allow companies a generous use of 
credits from Kyoto Mechanisms (up to 50 % in Spain (draft NAP) and Ireland); 
the use of the Kyoto Mechanisms by some old MS appears to be at odds with the 
EU's own former interpretation of the supplementarity rule. 
Our assessments of the stringency of the ET-budgets suggest that the purchase 
of these credits help to ease the reduction burden for installations covered by the 
ETS Directive. Adjusting for differences in the coverage of installations, we find 
that on average the ET-budgets in phase 2 are only about 3 % lower than the 
budgets in phase 1, than historical emissions in 2005 or than projected emissions 
in 2010. The comparison of the ET-budgets, for example, implies an annual emis-
sion reduction of less than 1 % between phase 1 and phase 2. These figures sug-
gest that the intended allocation for the ET-sector in 2008-12 will not require sig-
nificant reductions – given the error of margin on the data – actual emissions may 
– similar to phase 1 of the ETS – even be well below the intended allocation. Since 
the installations covered in our survey account for about 87 % of the allocation of 
these 18 MS in phase 1 of EU ETS, it is unlikely that this picture will change once 
the remaining NAPs become known. This would suggest that, unless the ET-
budgets are adjusted downwards, the price for EUAs, innovation incentives for 
low-carbon technologies, or demand for ERUs and CERs by companies are all 
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likely to be low as well.37 Our analyses of the stringency of the ET-budgets also 
show the dichotomy between old and new MS. While on average, old MS intend to 
reduce emissions by about 10 % for all three criteria, the implied average excess 
allocation in the new MS is substantial, ranging from 20 % to 30 %. Thus, the im-
plied excess allocation in the new MS all but eradicates some old MS' efforts to 
tighten their ET-budgets. 
Finally, exploring the cost-efficiency of the split in the required reduction efforts 
between trading and non-trading sectors in the MS, we find that, with the possible 
exception of the UK, the non-trading sectors have to bear a disproportionately high 
share of the reduction efforts in all EU 15 MS. Thus, while the ETS enables the 
trading sector to cost-efficiently achieve its ET-budget, the economy as a whole 
pays a premium for giving a more generous share of the Kyoto budget to the ET-
sector rather than to those sectors where it is more costly to achieve emissions 
reductions. In other words, the costs of achieving the Burden-Sharing targets 
would be lower if a cost-efficient split of the reduction target were determined and 
implemented. 
II) Micro-Level  
With regard to the allocation method, the majority of NAPs considered in this 
analysis allocate the entire ET-budget for free. To determine the allocation at the 
installation level, most EU-15 countries continue to apply a two step approach. In 
the first step, sector budgets are determined and, in a second step, EUAs are allo-
cated to individual installations. To address windfall profits in the power sector and 
since emission reduction costs are believed to be lower, EU-15 MS (notably Swe-
den and the UK) continue to allocate relatively fewer allowances to the power sec-
tor than to industry sectors. Germany has changed its allocation philosophy and 
now also applies a two-step approach. While all EU-15 MS have to apply compli-
ance factors either at the level of sector budgets or at the level of installations in 
order to meet emission targets, allocation at installation level in the new MS in this 
survey remains unconstrained, because these MS will easily manage to comply 
with their Kyoto-targets.  
Allocating allowances at the level of installations based on historical emissions in a 
base period (conventional grandfathering) continues to be the dominant ap-
proach for existing installations in phase 2 as well. But compared to phase 1, more 
MS decided to use benchmarks for existing installations (e.g. Belgium, Latvia, 
Sweden, the UK). As in phase 1, benchmarking is mainly applied in the power sec-
tor. Typically, average benchmarks are chosen, which are further differentiated by 
                                            
37 Since EUAs may be transferred from phase 2 into phase 3 of the EU ETS, prices of EUAs in 
phase 2 also depend on the expected stringency of future budgets. 
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fuels to soften distributional effects. Although benchmarking may provide higher 
incentives for modernization and accounts for early action, it proved infeasible in 
several MS because of its distributional implications. Also, in some cases (e.g. 
Germany), there is still a lack of objective data on the production levels of installa-
tions needed to calculate benchmarks which created uncertainty on the part of the 
government and the companies.  
Since verified emissions data at the level of installations were readily available 
from the first year of the EU ETS, Estonia, France, Germany, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia use data from the year 2005 to determine 
the quantities of EUAs to be allocated to individual installations (through base pe-
riods extending to 2005). To avoid strategic behaviour leading to inefficient deci-
sions on production and emission levels, MS should commit to abstain from up-
dating in the future.38 Likewise, to ban updating, the Directive may be changed. 
To reduce uncertainty on the part of companies, the regulations for phase 3 should 
be enforced as soon as possible.  
Compared to phase 1, where only four MS auctioned off part of their ET-budget, 
more countries will use auctioning and the share of allowances to be auctioned 
will increase to 1.3 % but this still falls short of the maximum level of 10 % allowed 
by the ETS Directive. In terms of quantity, at least five times as many allowances 
will be auctioned in phase 2 as was the case in phase 1. In the long run, this share 
should rise to 100 % because auctioning is able to avoid most, if not all problems 
and distributional aspects, such as early action, windfall profits or rules for new 
projects and closures of installations. Further, the outcome of an auction would be 
perceived as “fair”, because the 'polluter-pays' principle holds and auction reve-
nues could be used for other purposes, including compensation to households or 
companies for increased electricity prices, funding research and development in 
energy-efficient technologies or reducing public debt. In the light of the small in-
crease in auctioning from phase 1 to phase 2, it may be more effective to set a 
minimum level rather than a maximum level for the share of allowances MS are 
required to auction off.39  
In the political discussion of the NAPs in several MS, the question of how to best 
address windfall profits got mixed up with the issue of competitiveness. While 
windfall profits are the consequence of the free allocation of allowances, higher 
output prices (e.g. electricity prices) are the consequence of putting a price tag on 
                                            
38  Updating was avoided by some MS who did not use 2005 emissions data, but stuck to earlier 
years or projected data or, as in Italy, use the 2007 allocation rather than emissions. 
39  For example, the emission trading scheme under the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI) includes a minimum auction share of 25 %.  
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carbon dioxide due to the EU ETS. The former is an issue that should be dealt 
with in the NAPs, e.g. through tighter allocation for those companies benefiting 
from free allocation, or through auctioning. The latter is an intended effect of the 
EU ETS and should not be affected by the allocation method. The EU ETS 
changes the relative prices of factors of production, and thus necessarily affects 
competitiveness: carbon-intensive production should become relatively more ex-
pensive. This effect on output prices, however, should be the same whether allow-
ances are allocated for free or auctioned off. In any case, competition may be dis-
torted if electricity-intensive industries like the aluminium industry compete interna-
tionally with companies from countries where there is no climate policy in place. 
Production may then shift to those countries and total emissions may actually in-
crease if production processes abroad are more carbon-intensive (leakage ef-
fects). Since the source of windfall profits rests in the method of allocation, the is-
sue of windfall profits should be addressed in the NAPs. In contrast, the issue of 
competitiveness is not affected by the method used to allocate allowances, and 
would have to be dealt with outside the NAPs.40
From a long-term perspective, the allocation rules for new installations and mod-
ernizations are crucial since they (together with several other factors) determine 
investment decisions and thus affect the technology structure and CO2-intensity of 
the capital stock for many years. The logic of emission trading requires that all al-
lowances for new projects be purchased at market prices, ensuring that invest-
ment decisions are based on the full social costs (i.e. private costs plus environ-
mental cost). Allocating free allowances to new projects – as foreseen in the 
NAPS of all MS via new entrant reserves - amounts to subsidizing investments 
(and output), increasing — ceteris paribus — the costs of achieving climate tar-
gets. New MS, in particular, allocate free allowances to new projects primarily 
based on BAT-values for individual installations from all sectors. The use of BAT-
benchmarks has also increased in old MS in phase 2, where they have become 
the dominating allocation method for installations in the power sector. Based on 
the limited information provided so far, it seems that only Flanders and Wallonia in 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden and the UK are applying uniform benchmarks. In-
stallations in the power sector tend to be differentiated by fuel and fuel inputs and 
by technologies or sub-product groups in the industry sectors. Applying differenti-
ated benchmarks or differences in standardized activity rates distorts the dynamic 
innovation incentives and also results in higher reduction costs for society in the 
long run. Differentiated benchmarks are, in essence, technology- or fuel-specific 
                                            
40  One possibility is to introduce border tax adjustments such as imposing import tariffs on pro-
ducts from countries without climate policies, and export subsidies for exports from the EU into 
countries without climate policies (see, e.g. Grubb, Neuhoff 2006).  
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subsidies to preserve existing production structures. They run counter to the logic 
of emission trading systems, where market prices and flexibility should guide in-
vestment decisions rather than subsidies for particular types of installations. Nev-
ertheless, from an economic, environmental and distributive perspective, basing 
allocation to new projects on differentiated benchmarks and standardized activity 
rates is still preferable to using installation-specific emission values together with 
projected activity rates for which operators have an incentive to project "optimistic" 
data. The example of high standardized utilization rates for new power installa-
tions, however, illustrates that standardization by itself is not the panacea for sav-
ing the NER. To reduce uncertainty about the total supply of EUAs, several MS 
need to specify how they would manage a possible NER surplus (cancelling or 
selling/auctioning). Several MS have followed and may follow the example of 
Germany from phase 1 and implement reserve replenishment mechanisms, which 
essentially allow borrowing EUAs from future trading periods. If future reduction 
costs are lower than current costs, such mechanisms would actually reduce total 
emissions over time, but the opposite may also be true. Moreover, these mecha-
nisms shift a potentially increasing burden of reducing emissions into the future, 
which may also be at odds with concerns of intergenerational equity. 
Since MS also appear to use the allocation rules for new entrants to attract new 
investments and thus compete against each other, it is necessary to change the 
ETS Directive to solve this prisoner's dilemma situation and achieve the socially 
optimal outcome: no free allocation to new projects. Such a rule, of course, would 
become obsolete once all allowances were auctioned. Until then, MS would not 
only have to use harmonized benchmarks to level the playing field for investments 
in new projects across MS, but also identical activity rates and compliance factors. 
Differences in other, potentially more relevant investment criteria across MS would 
remain.  
From an economic perspective, operators of closed installations should continue 
to receive the intended quantity of allowances, as is typically the case in cap-and-
trade systems (e.g. Ellerman et al. 2003). Since most, if not all MS linked the per-
mit to emit greenhouse gases with the permit to operate, closure of a plant auto-
matically terminates allocation. Typically, the issuing of allowances ends with the 
year of closure. To provide additional incentives for investments, more MS intend 
to allow the transfer of allocated allowances from closed installations to new ones, 
but this transfer is usually restricted to the same operator and/or the same product 
activity, thus tackling inefficiency only partially.  
As in phase 1, MS included a set of various special provisions in their NAPs for 
phase 2 to account for early action, process-related emissions, or to shield or 
compensate small emitters.   
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Unlike in phase 1, EU-15 MS no longer provide direct compensation for early ac-
tion at the level of installations. Instead, more MS (including Germany) account for 
early action indirectly by allowing long base periods. In contrast, several new MS 
either continue (Estonia and Poland) or even introduce (Lithuania) new rules for 
direct support in phase 2. With regard to process-related emissions, the MS 
which had special provisions in phase 1 either at the level of sectors or installa-
tions apply the same rules in phase 2 as well. Some MS (the Netherlands and 
Lithuania) have decided to introduce special rules for process-related emissions in 
phase 2. As was the case in phase 1, only a few MS have decided to shield small 
emitters in phase 2, but opting-out of installations is no longer feasible under the 
Directive. For example, Germany now applies a higher compliance factor to instal-
lations with average base period emissions below 25,000 t CO2e/a. The Nether-
lands and the Flemish region in Belgium interpret the rules given in Annex I (ETS 
Directive) for the aggregation of capacities in a way that is perhaps not consistent 
with the view held by the Commission. So far, the Commission's attempt to har-
monise the inclusion and interpretation of Annex I (CEC 2005b) has led to the in-
clusion of 45.13 Mt CO2e/a estimated41 in phase 2 compared to phase 1. In the 
future, the Directive may be amended by changing the criteria for the installations 
to be covered by the Directive. These decisions should be seen in the light of the 
intended inclusion of other greenhouse gases and sectors into the EU ETS. If 
there are only numerous small emitters for some gases, an upstream regulation 
may be more appropriate, where a few producers rather than many emitters would 
participate in the scheme (AEA Technology Environment, Ecofys UK 2006). 
Based on the NAPs of the MS included in this survey, a comparison of the alloca-
tion rules between phase 1 and phase 2 yields mixed results. First, as a general 
observation, MS tend to stick to the allocation concepts and methodologies (e.g. 
high degree of free allocation, rules for new installations and closures) applied in 
phase 1. This path dependency of policies helps to explain the observed small 
progress in the implementation of more efficient allocation rules and more 
harmonized rules across MS. Of course, as a result of the NAP guidance for 
phase 2 the types of installations covered in each country have been harmonised. 
In the same way, the efficiency of the system has been improved because the 
NAP guidance ban ex-post adjustments. Distributing free allowances to new pro-
jects and stopping allocation after closure in all MS are examples for where implicit 
harmonisation has prevailed, but the outcome is not economically efficient.  
Areas of harmonisation which were not triggered by EC rules/guidelines include 
the use of benchmarks for existing and new energy installations, although the 
                                            
41  Data for Italy are not yet available. 
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benchmarks and standard utilization rates used differ substantially across the MS. 
Differences in the benchmarks for new industry installations are even larger be-
cause production technologies are more heterogeneous across MS. Likewise, an 
increased use of transfer rules in the case of closures can be observed, but the 
transfer terms vary across MS. In almost all the EU-15 MS in our sample, alloca-
tion to the power sector is more stringent than the allocation to industry sectors 
(Luxembourg does not differentiate between sectors). Also, most EU-15 MS (in-
cluding Germany) now use a two step approach, but as was shown in section 3, 
the logic applied to arrive at sector budgets varies considerably.  
Examples for improved efficiency which were not the result of further specifications 
of the European Commission, e.g. through the NAP guidance, are the increase in 
the share of allowances to be auctioned off (especially in the UK, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands), or the use of less differentiated BAT-benchmarks for gratis allo-
cation to new entrants in some MS (e.g. power installations Germany, Luxemburg 
and the UK).  
Also, some countries have managed to reduce the complexity of the allocation 
rules compared to phase 1. This is especially true for Germany, where allocation 
in phase 1 was based on almost 60 different rules or combinations of rules. Some 
MS have also facilitated or abandoned special provisions for early action, process-
related emissions or CHP installations. Likewise, the use of benchmarks together 
with standardised utilisation rates to determine the quantity of allowances for new 
installations (e.g. Germany, Italy, France, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden, and the 
UK) also improves the transparency of allocation rules. However, these im-
provements can be observed almost exclusively in the EU-15 MS. In contrast, 
several new MS have introduced special allocation rules in phase 2. For example, 
Lithuania has introduced special provisions for CHP and early action, and Poland 
has created a special reserve for forestry in the event that a change in the Directi-
ve includes this sector in the EU ETS. When reviewing the NAPs, the European 
Commission will also have to assess whether the opt-in provisions for small enti-
ties which appear, among others, in the NAPs of Lithuania and Latvia, are at-
tempts to further increase ET-budgets and unduly favour domestic companies. In 
general, the allocation for JI set-asides in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland 
appears to suffer from double counting which would lead to inflated ET-budgets. 
Since the EU ETS Directive requires that companies not be unduly favoured (An-
nex III, criteria 5), the European Commission needs to ensure that MS do not un-
justifiably over-allocate to their companies.  
In particular, the decisions by the European Commission need to address the lack 
of environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency identified in this study. The 
outcome of the European Commission's review process will not only act as a sig-
nal to those MS who have not yet submitted their NAPs. Perhaps even more im-
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portant, it will have repercussions for other carbon markets and investments and 
technology transfer through JI and CDM. Likewise, the Commission's assessment 
may boost or hamper other emission trading schemes being set up around the 
world and will impact on Post 2012 international climate policy negotiations. 
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ANNEX I:  
Summary Table of National Allocation Plans for Phase 2 
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